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The Separate Spheres Ideology: An Improved 
Empirical and Litigation Approach to Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination  
Andrea L. Miller* 
In a 2008 commercial for Oreo cookies, a man and his son 
appear on the screen enjoying a few moments of quality time as 
they eat their Oreos together.1 When the camera zooms out, it 
is clear that they are not in the same location, but are using a 
webcam to interact.2 The man says, “goodnight, buddy,” and the 
boy says, “good morning, dad,” indicating that they are in dif-
ferent time zones.3 After the boy climbs into bed, the camera 
pans back to the man’s location, and he is shown sitting in a 
hotel room wearing a suit.4 The ad suggests that a positive, in-
volved father is a man who spends time with his son over the 
Internet while he travels across the globe for his job.  
While career devotion is traditionally regarded as the 
hallmark of good fatherhood, mothers are held to different 
standards.5 Much public discussion in recent years centers on 
the plight of women who want to both pursue their careers and 
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota Law School; Ph.D. Can-
didate 2015, University of Minnesota Department of Psychology; B.A. 2009, 
New York University. Thank you to those who provided feedback on this Note, 
particularly Professor Jill Hasday, Professor June Carbone, Rachel Kitze, and 
Aleksander Ksiazkiewicz. Thanks also to the staff and editors of the Minneso-
ta Law Review. Many thanks to Eugene Borgida for supporting my psychology 
research in this area and for supporting my decision to go to law school. Copy-
right © 2014 by Andrea L. Miller. 
 1. Laptop (Nabisco television advertisement May 5, 2008), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yl95nIN3Jx8. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Joan C. Williams et al., Cultural Schemas, Social Class, and the Flex-
ibility Stigma, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 209, 220–21 (2013).  
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parent their children.6 Because the traditional conception of 
motherhood requires women to be present and intimately in-
volved in the day-to-day aspects of their children’s lives, work-
ing mothers experience significant work-life conflict and dispar-
ities in income and advancement.7 Traditional gender norms 
dictate that men belong in the public sphere and women belong 
in the domestic sphere; gender scholarship and social science 
research, including my own, refer to this set of beliefs as the 
separate spheres ideology.8  
In recent years, however, there is increasing recognition 
that many fathers desire more active involvement in their fami-
ly lives.9 Men’s increased involvement in the household division 
of labor, while beneficial to both men and women,10 is neverthe-
less hampered by family responsibilities discrimination in the 
workplace.11 Family responsibilities discrimination (FRD) is 
discrimination against an individual on the basis of his or her 
real or perceived caregiving responsibilities.12 FRD can take 
many different forms, including denying a mother a promotion 
because her employer assumes that she does not want to travel 
for work, denying light duty to pregnant women but providing 
it liberally for men with back injuries, or denying a father fami-
ly leave because his employer thinks his wife should be taking 
care of things at home.13 FRD jurisprudence developed rapidly 
over the last decade, with cases arising under various legal 
 
 6. E.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, THE 
ATLANTIC, June 13, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/ 
07/why-women-still-cant-have-it-all/309020. 
 7. STEPHANIE COONTZ, A STRANGE STIRRING: THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 
AND AMERICAN WOMEN AT THE DAWN OF THE 1960S 177–78 (2011); Williams 
et al., supra note 5, at 210, 221–22. 
 8. Andrea L. Miller & Eugene Borgida, The Separate Spheres Ideology 
and Gendered Inequality in Society 4 (Aug. 2, 2014) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author). 
 9. See generally KATHLEEN GERSON, THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: 
COMING OF AGE IN A NEW ERA OF GENDER, WORK, AND FAMILY (2010). 
 10. Joan C. Williams, Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender Revolution: Jus-
tice Ginsburg and Reconstructive Feminism, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1267, 1282–86 
(2012). 
 11. Williams et al., supra note 5, at 211–12, 220–21. 
 12. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: 
The Growing Trend of Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 171, 171 (2006). 
 13. Id. at 177–78, 181. These examples are drawn from real FRD cases. 
Id. Light duty is a temporary set of job duties that is designed to accommodate 
an employee’s health restrictions. For examples, see Light Duty Job, WASH. 
ST. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS., http://www.lni.wa.gov/ClaimsIns/Claims/RTW/ 
LightDuty/default.asp (last visited October 16, 2014).  
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causes of action related to employment discrimination.14 FRD 
affects both men and women, although in distinct ways.15 The 
rapid growth in this area of law and the number of courts grap-
pling with new types of FRD claims simultaneously may ex-
plain why FRD jurisprudence has been fragmented and unco-
ordinated. Plaintiffs’ success in FRD cases often depends on 
individual lawyers’ and judges’ understanding of gender stereo-
typing; as a result, inconsistent and inaccurate lay theories 
about gender often impact case outcomes.16 While women have 
experienced increasing success as plaintiffs by arguing that 
FRD is a form of Title VII sex discrimination, men have gener-
ally not succeeded as plaintiffs under this legal theory.17  
This Note posits that new social psychology research on the 
separate spheres ideology provides a theoretical approach to 
FRD that can unite existing disparate legal understandings of 
FRD into a coherent, empirically supported legal doctrine. One 
of the major problems this theoretical approach can address is 
the low success rate of male FRD plaintiffs compared to wom-
en. Part I of this Note describes existing social-psychological 
research on FRD in the workplace. Part II analyzes the devel-
opment of FRD jurisprudence and the currently fragmented 
state of FRD case law. Part II also discusses the widespread in-
ability (or unwillingness) of the courts to recognize FRD as a 
form of sex discrimination against men. Part III proposes that 
the Separate Spheres Model provides a useful litigation frame-
work for legal actors in FRD cases. This Note argues that by 
adopting an empirically grounded social-psychological under-
standing of FRD in litigation, judges are in a better position to 
develop a coherent body of law reflecting the realities of gender 
roles in modern society and providing justice to plaintiffs of any 
gender who are harmed by FRD in the workplace. 
I.  CURRENT SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO 
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION   
Legal scholars in the area of FRD consistently rely on so-
cial psychology research to inform their theories of sex discrim-
 
 14. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 12, at 172, 181–82. 
 15. Williams et al., supra note 5, at 220–22. 
 16. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Be-
hind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias in Social Psychology and Employment 
Discrimination Law, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 835 (2004). 
 17. Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-
Family Conflicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297, 1299–1300 (2012). 
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ination and their litigation strategies.18 Indeed, from the time 
FRD first developed as a potential legal claim, legal scholarship 
in this area has been in tune with social science knowledge re-
garding gender inequality in the workplace.19 The interdiscipli-
nary nature of FRD law is a strength, as it ensures that FRD 
theorizing is grounded in empirical reality. It also makes it 
more likely that FRD law will develop in ways that reflect the 
actual lived experiences of the men and women harmed by rigid 
gender norms and gendered inequality.  
This Part provides background information on the current 
state of gendered workplace inequality and on the existing so-
cial-psychological research that has informed FRD theorizing 
thus far. Part A describes the current state of gender inequality 
in the United States. Part B summarizes the psychological the-
ory of descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping. Finally, Part C 
introduces a new psychological approach called the Separate 
Spheres Model. 
A. THE MODERN PROBLEM OF GENDER INEQUALITY 
The United States has made remarkable progress toward 
economic equality between men and women in many ways. For 
example, income levels for childless women under thirty are 
almost equal to those of men in the same category.20 For women 
who are mothers, however, the situation is not so rosy. Accord-
ing to legal scholar Joan Williams, the motherhood penalty, or 
the “maternal wall,” has severe economic consequences for 
women.21 As of 2010, for example, mothers earned sixty-seven 
cents for every dollar earned by fathers.22 Sociologist Stephanie 
Coontz similarly argues that “[m]otherhood may in fact have 
replaced gender as the primary factor constraining women’s 
choices.”23 Gender inequality, it seems, cannot simply be re-
duced to sex or gender; it is often driven by the intersection be-
 
 18. See generally, e.g., Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereo-
typing: Using Social Science To Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and 
Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401 (2003). 
 19. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 101–10 (2000). 
 20. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN 
AND CLASS MATTER 15 (2010). 
 21. Id. 
 22. JOAN WILLIAMS ET AL., CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW, “OPT OUT” OR 
PUSHED OUT?: HOW THE PRESS COVERS WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT 17 (2006), 
available at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut.pdf. 
 23. COONTZ, supra note 7, at 177–78. 
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tween gender and caregiving responsibilities.24 Legal scholar-
ship and social science research on FRD recognize this complex-
ity and attempt to address gendered inequality in the work-
place as it relates to caregiving responsibilities.25 A major 
program of research that uses this approach is the theory of de-
scriptive and prescriptive stereotyping.  
B. THE THEORY OF DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE 
STEREOTYPING 
For more than a decade, the dominant social-psychological 
approach to studying FRD has been to investigate the role of 
descriptive and prescriptive gender stereotypes.26 Until recent-
ly, research on descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping in 
FRD focused almost exclusively on discrimination against 
women.27 This Part describes how this area of research contrib-
utes to our understanding of gender discrimination in the 
workplace. Part 1 discusses research on discrimination against 
women, Part 2 discusses research on discrimination against 
men, and Part 3 discusses the types of social interventions that 
have developed out of these bodies of research. 
 
 24. Of course, gender inequality is also characterized by intersections 
with race, class, sexuality, immigrant status, disability, and many other 
sources of inequality. See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family, and Dis-
crimination at the Bottom of the Ladder, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1 
(2012). While these intersecting identities are an integral aspect of gender in-
equality and FRD, they are outside the scope of this Note. 
 25. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 20; Williams et al., supra note 5. 
 26. See, e.g., Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who 
Women Should Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex 
Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 665 passim (1999); Joan C. Wil-
liams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 365, 387 (2004); Joan C. Williams & Allison Tait, “Mancession” or 
“Momcession”?: Good Providers, a Bad Economy, and Gender Discrimination, 
86 CHI.-KENT L. REV 857, 865 (2011). 
 27. See generally, e.g., Michelle Hebl et al., Hostile and Benevolent Reac-
tions Toward Pregnant Women: Complementary Interpersonal Punishments 
and Rewards that Maintain Traditional Roles, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1499 
(2007); Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and 
Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743 (2001); Pamela Stone 
& Lisa Ackerly Hernandez, The All-or-Nothing Workplace: Flexibility Stigma 
and “Opting Out” Among Professional-Managerial Women, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 
235 (2013). 
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1. Family Responsibilities Discrimination Against Gender-
Conforming Women 
Descriptive stereotypes describe how men and women are 
thought to be.28 Traditionally, men are thought to be “agentic” 
and competent while women are thought to be “communal” and 
warm.29 When a woman has a child, announces she is pregnant, 
or activates maternal concepts in some other way in the work-
place, people tend to see her as having more feminine attrib-
utes (i.e., warmth) and fewer masculine attributes (i.e., compe-
tence).30 People endorsing these descriptive stereotypes often 
assume that mothers are less competent and less committed to 
the workplace than non-mothers, because they seem to fit the 
descriptive stereotypes of women.31 One of the consequences of 
descriptive stereotypes about women is FRD. The perception 
that women who engage in caregiving are less competent can 
lead to fewer recommendations for promotions,32 lower hiring 
rates,33 and less willingness to educate mothers compared to 
other employees.34 Women are also penalized by the assumption 
that they may become caregivers, even when they have not had 
children.35  
In contrast to descriptive stereotypes, prescriptive stereo-
types describe how men and women should be.36 Specifically, 
people endorsing prescriptive gender stereotypes believe that 
 
 28. Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Ste-
reotypes Prevent Women’s Ascent up the Organization Ladder, 57 J. SOC. IS-
SUES 657, 658–59 (2001). 
 29. Id. at 658. 
 30. Id.; see also Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype 
Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status 
and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878, 887 (2002) (finding 
that housewives are consistently perceived as high in warmth and low in com-
petence); Heilman, supra note 28, at 666–69 (finding that women who are per-
ceived as competent in the workplace are also perceived as interpersonally de-
ficient). 
 31. Kathleen Fuegen et al., Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How 
Gender and Parental Status Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 
60 J. SOC. ISSUES 737, 748 (2004). 
 32. Madeline E. Heilman & Tyler G. Okimoto, Motherhood: A Potential 
Source of Bias in Employment Decisions, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 189, 196 
(2008). 
 33. Amy J.C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth 
Doesn’t Cut the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701, 711 (2004). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Alexander H. Jordan & Emily M. Zitek, Marital Status Bias in Percep-
tions of Employees, 34 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 474, 479 (2012). 
 36. Heilman, supra note 28, at 659. 
MILLER_4fmt 11/3/2014 4:51 PM 
2014] THE SEPARATE SPHERES IDEOLOGY 349 
 
men should be agentic and competent and that women should 
be communal and warm.37 In the employment context, this 
means that people tend to prescribe that women should engage 
in caregiving rather than trying to be competent in the work-
place.38 Like descriptive stereotypes, prescriptive stereotypes 
about women can lead to FRD. For example, in many organiza-
tions, there is a stigma against women who make use of their 
companies’ flexibility policies (e.g., part-time hours, parental 
leave, tele-commuting).39 The use of flexibility benefits can re-
sult in wage penalties, lower performance evaluations, fewer 
promotions, and lower-status assignments.40 For women, this 
stigma originates in prescriptive stereotypes that expect wom-
en to prioritize childrearing over their careers (thus making 
them ideal parents but bad employees).41 Women who are 
mothers or who use flexibility benefits at work are seen as ful-
filling their proper gender role by engaging in caregiving, but 
deviating from proper workplace performance.42 In many work-
places, women are actually praised for opting out of the work-
place entirely to care for their children, but are punished if they 
stay at work and make use of flexibility policies.43 Thus, while 
FRD against women is based on their actual or perceived care-
giving duties, it is also based on descriptive and prescriptive 
stereotypes about women as belonging in the home rather than 
the workplace. In other words, although this type of FRD oc-
curs against a specific sub-group of women, it is based on sex 
and gender. 
2. Family Responsibilities Discrimination Against Gender-
Nonconforming Men 
In recent years, researchers have recognized that gender 
equality in the workplace is not only a matter of women’s work-
 
 37. Id. 
 38. See generally Hebl et al., supra note 27; Rudman & Glick, supra note 
27. 
 39. Williams et al., supra note 5, at 209–10. 
 40. Jeffrey R. Cohen & Louise E. Single, An Examination of the Perceived 
Impact of Flexible Work Arrangements on Professional Opportunities in Public 
Accounting, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 317, 324–25 (2001); Jennifer Glass, Blessing or 
Curse?: Work-Family Policies and Mother’s Wage Growth Over Time, 31 WORK 
& OCCUPATIONS 367, 387 (2004); Stone & Hernandez, supra note 27, at 246–
52; see generally PAMELA STONE, OPTING OUT? WHY WOMEN REALLY QUIT CA-
REERS AND HEAD HOME (2007). 
 41. Williams et al., supra note 5, at 221–22. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Stone & Hernandez, supra note 27, at 252. 
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life conflict and how women are treated at work; if gender 
equality is to be achieved, men must also be able to participate 
fully in their family lives.44 It turns out that men, like women, 
experience FRD at work; FRD against men, however, originates 
in different prescriptive stereotypes. Prescriptive stereotypes of 
men dictate that they should devote themselves fully to compe-
tence in the workplace.45 Because earning a living is seen as the 
central role of fatherhood, fathers are heavily penalized for us-
ing flexibility benefits at work; using flexibility benefits is re-
garded as inappropriate for men, because it detracts from their 
complete career devotion.46 In other words, FRD for men who 
attempt to contribute at home results from men’s gender-
nonconforming behavior. This is in contrast to FRD against 
women, which, as described above,47 results from women’s sup-
posedly gender-conforming behavior of prioritizing children 
over work. Thus, while both men and women experience FRD, 
this stigma is highly gendered and may be experienced in dis-
tinct ways. Furthermore, although FRD is directed only at sub-
sets of men and women, social-psychological evidence makes 
clear that it is based on sex and gender. 
3. Interventions Made Possible by the Descriptive and 
Prescriptive Stereotyping Approach 
Investigating FRD through the lens of descriptive and pre-
scriptive stereotyping puts the explanatory focus on the indi-
vidual being discriminated against. In other words, from this 
perspective, the trigger of the discrimination is the victim’s 
gender-conforming or gender-nonconforming behavior, and the 
result is the backlash that another person engages in against 
the victim. Researchers attempting to find ways to reduce this 
type of backlash in the workplace have identified strategies in-
dividuals can use to prevent negative reactions from others. For 
 
 44. See Bornstein, supra note 17, at 1299–1300; Williams, supra note 10, 
at 1282–86. 
 45. Williams et al., supra note 5, at 220–21; Williams & Tait, supra note 
26, at 865–69. 
 46. Jennifer L. Berdahl & Sue H. Moon, Workplace Mistreatment of Mid-
dle Class Workers Based on Sex, Parenthood, and Caregiving, 69 J. SOC. IS-
SUES 341, 358 (2013); Scott Coltrane et al., Fathers and the Flexibility Stigma, 
69 J. SOC. ISSUES 279, 297–98 (2013); Laurie A. Rudman & Kris Mescher, Pe-
nalizing Men Who Request a Family Leave: Is Flexibility Stigma a Femininity 
Stigma?, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 322, 335–36 (2013); Joseph A. Vandello et al., 
When Equal Isn’t Really Equal: The Masculine Dilemma of Seeking Work Flex-
ibility, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 303, 315–16 (2013). 
 47. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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example, recent research suggests that women may be able to 
reduce the effects of their caregiver status on perceptions of 
their low commitment to work by explicitly stating their com-
mitment to the job over the family.48 However, researchers also 
recognize that this strategy is risky, because women who signal 
devotion to the workplace over their families may be penalized 
for not acting appropriately warm and feminine, as prescriptive 
stereotypes dictate.49 Therefore, it seems that intervention 
strategies that require men and women to engage in complex 
gender performances to reduce backlash against them require 
significant effort and may often fail.50 Other types of interven-
tion strategies have not been forthcoming from social psycholo-
gists, which may be due to the fact that the descriptive and 
prescriptive stereotyping approach puts the locus of causation 
on the victim of discrimination, making it difficult to intervene 
in any other way. The next Part will discuss the Separate 
Spheres Model as an alternative approach to studying FRD and 
the benefits of this approach for scientific inquiry and social in-
tervention.  
C. THE SEPARATE SPHERES MODEL 
Although research on descriptive and prescriptive stereo-
typing has been the primary theoretical approach to the study 
of FRD in social psychology, a new area of research investigates 
FRD using an approach called the Separate Spheres Model.51 
Research on descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes inspired 
the Separate Spheres Model, but the Separate Spheres Model 
diverges from the previous approach in several important ways. 
Part 1 of this section describes the separate spheres ideology, 
and Part 2 discusses how the Separate Spheres Model differs 
from previous approaches to gender discrimination. 
 
 48. Beatriz Aranda & Peter Glick, Signaling Devotion to Work over Fami-
ly Undermines the Motherhood Penalty, 17 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP 
REL. 91, 96 (2014). 
 49. Id. at 98; Stephen Benard & Shelley J. Correll, Normative Discrimina-
tion and the Motherhood Penalty, 24 GENDER & SOC’Y 616, 639 (2010). 
 50. See Hannah Riley Bowles & Linda Babcock, How Can Women Escape 
the Compensation Negotiation Dilemma? Relational Accounts Are One Answer, 
37 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 80, 90–91 (2013); Laura J. Kray et al., Feminine 
Charm: An Experimental Analysis of Its Costs and Benefits in Negotiations, 38 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1343, 1253–54 (2012). 
 51. See generally Miller & Borgida, supra note 8. 
MILLER_4fmt 11/3/2014 4:51 PM 
352 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:343 
 
1. The Separate Spheres Ideology 
According to the Separate Spheres Model, FRD and gender 
inequality in today’s society are at least partly caused by indi-
viduals’ endorsement of the separate spheres ideology.52 The 
separate spheres ideology (SSI), as I have defined it in my own 
research, is a belief system that claims that: “1) gender differ-
ences in society are innate, rather than culturally or 
situationally created; 2) these innate differences lead men and 
women to freely participate in different spheres of society; and 
3) gendered differences in participation in public and private 
spheres are natural, inevitable, and desirable.”53 The remainder 
of this Part will explain each of the three tenets of the SSI in 
more detail and discuss existing empirical research that con-
tributes to our understanding of each tenet. 
a. The Belief that Gender Differences Are Innate 
The first tenet of the SSI is the belief that gender differ-
ences are innate or biologically determined, rather than cultur-
ally or situationally created.54 Of course, it is likely that some 
gender differences are rooted in a combination of biological dif-
ferences and cultural processes that socialize men and women 
to be different. However, those who endorse the SSI rely heavi-
ly on biological explanations for gender differences to the exclu-
sion of socialization explanations.55 For example, it is a relative-
ly common assumption of the courts that biology dictates that 
women act as the primary caregivers for their children.56 Under 
 
 52. See generally id.  
 53. Id. at 4. There is an extensive literature on the separate spheres as a 
nineteenth century construct. See, e.g., Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, 
Female Worlds, Woman’s Place: The Rhetoric of Women’s History, 75 J. AM. 
HIST. 9 passim (1988). In this Note, and in my broader program of research on 
the separate spheres ideology, I use the term differently. The separate spheres 
ideology as it is referred to here is a measurable psychological construct—an 
ideological belief system—that is characterized by individual differences and 
plays a role in individual cognition, attitudes, and behavior. See generally Mil-
ler & Borgida, supra note 8. 
 54. Miller & Borgida, supra note 8, at 5. 
 55. Id. at 5–6. For more research on gender essentialism, see generally 
Victoria Brescoll & Marianne LaFrance, The Correlates and Consequences of 
Newspaper Reports of Research on Sex Differences, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 515 
(2004); Carol Lynn Martin & Sandra Parker, Folk Theories About Sex and 
Race Differences, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 45 (1995); Deborah 
A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, Essentializing Differences Between Women and 
Men, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 129 (2006). 
 56. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. 
REV. 955, 997 (1984). 
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this view, motherhood is characterized as an inevitable respon-
sibility and fatherhood is characterized as an “opportunity” for 
men to engage in nurturing.57 Even the U.S. Census Bureau de-
fines parental roles in ways that make maternal caregiving, 
and not paternal caregiving, appear to be a biological inevita-
bility.58 The Bureau classifies the time fathers spend taking 
care of their own children as “childcare,” on the same level as 
using a nanny, babysitter, or daycare institution.59 In contrast, 
the Bureau considers mothers to be the default parents, and 
time that children spend with their mothers is not classified as 
“childcare.”60 
In contrast to the common belief that gender differences 
are biologically determined, researchers have identified power-
ful cultural and psychological processes that create and exacer-
bate gender differences. For example, as described above, pre-
scriptive stereotypes serve to police men and women into 
gender-stereotypical behaviors.61 Recent sociological research 
suggests that young men and women share remarkably similar 
aspirations for the future; they both tend to want to live in 
committed, egalitarian families in which both partners work 
and contribute equally at home.62 However, both young men 
and women sense that institutional forces will make this egali-
tarian ideal difficult to achieve in practice; as a result, these 
forces lead young men and women to develop different fallback 
strategies that vary by gender.63 Psychologists have also 
demonstrated that environmental factors can be very effective 
 
 57. Id.  
 58. K.J. Dell’Antonia, The Census Bureau Counts Fathers as ‘Child Care,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012), http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/the 
-census-bureau-counts-fathers-as-child-care; LYNDA LAUGHLIN, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, WHO’S MINDING THE KIDS? CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS: SPRING 
2005/SUMMER 2006 at 1 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2010pubs/p70-121.pdf.  
 59. LAUGHLIN, supra note 58, at 1.  
 60. Id. 
 61. See supra Parts I.B.1–2; see also, e.g., Rudman & Glick, supra note 27, 
at 744–45; Rudman & Mescher, supra note 46, at 323–24. 
 62. See generally GERSON, supra note 9 (discussing the frustrations new 
generations of workers feel regarding traditional gender mentalities and di-
chotomies). 
 63. Id. Gerson found that young men were more likely to fall back on a 
strategy of finding a woman partner who would handle all of their domestic 
needs, so that they would not compromise any of their career goals. Id. at 162–
64. Young women, in contrast, were more likely to fall back on a strategy of 
taking full responsibility for both their career and domestic concerns, so that 
they would be financially independent from men. Id. at 126–28. 
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in creating gender differences. For example, women in one 
study who watched an advertisement that featured stereotypi-
cal gender roles performed worse on a math test, but better on 
a verbal test, than women who watched a non-stereotypical 
ad.64 This result suggests that simple environmental factors can 
cause men and women to conform to gender stereotypes that 
they otherwise would not. However, individuals who endorse 
the SSI attribute gender differences primarily to biological 
causes at the expense of recognizing these known environmen-
tal causes of gender differences.65 
b. The Belief that Men and Women Freely Choose Separate 
Spheres 
The second tenet of the SSI is the belief that men’s and 
women’s innate differences lead them to freely participate in 
different spheres of society.66 For example, print media consist-
ently perpetuate the idea that mothers are opting out of the 
workplace in droves, in order to pursue a more fulfilling life-
style of caring for their children.67 In truth, women who leave 
the workplace when they have children are not as common as 
popularly believed; furthermore, they are often low-income 
women who leave because they cannot afford to pay for child-
care on their low wages.68  
 
 64. Paul G. Davies et al., Consuming Images: How Television Commer-
cials that Elicit Stereotype Threat Can Restrain Women Academically and Pro-
fessionally, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1615, 1626 (2002); see 
also Jennifer R. Steele & Nalini Ambady, “Math Is Hard!”: The Effect of Gen-
der Priming on Women’s Attitudes, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 428, 
431–32 (2006). 
 65. See Miller & Borgida, supra note 8, at 5. 
 66. Id. at 6. 
 67. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 22, at 10–12; see also Lisa Belkin, The 
Retro Wife Opts Out: What Has Changed, and What Still Needs To, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lisa-
belkin/retro 
-wife-opt-out_b_2902315.html; Arielle Kuperberg & Pamela Stone, The Media 
Depiction of Women Who Opt Out, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y 497, 497–98, 512 
(2008). For an example of the opt-out myth in print media, see Lisa Belkin, 
The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2003), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/26/magazine/26WOMEN.html. 
 68. Anna North, Why the Opt-Out Story Won’t Die, BUZZFEED (Mar. 18, 
2013), http://www.buzzfeed.com/annanorth/why-the-opt-out-story-wont-die; 
Lydia Saad, Stay-at-Home Moms in U.S. Lean Independent, Lower-Income, 
GALLUP (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/153995/Stay-Home-Moms 
-Lean-Independent-Lower-Income.aspx. 
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Research from psychology also demonstrates that men and 
women can be led fairly easily to participate in more or less 
stereotypical spheres.69 For example, women in one study who 
watched ads that featured stereotypical gender roles, compared 
to women who watched non-stereotypical ads, were less likely 
to volunteer for a leadership role in a later task,70 expressed 
less interest in careers that involved quantitative skills,71 and 
deemphasized achievement relative to homemaking in their 
plans for the future.72 In another study, priming women with 
traditional gender roles led to reduced interest in masculine ca-
reer domains.73 Finally, participants in one study were led to 
believe that their interaction partners were either male or fe-
male, regardless of the targets’ actual sex; the participants 
then unknowingly induced the partners to choose jobs that 
were stereotypically masculine or feminine, respectively.74 
Thus, while there are powerful situational and institutional 
forces influencing men and women to participate in separate 
gendered spheres, individuals who endorse the SSI character-
ize this pattern as a matter of personal choice by individual 
women and men.75 
c. The Belief that Separate Spheres Are Natural and Desirable 
The third tenet of the SSI is the belief that separated gen-
dered spheres in society are natural and desirable.76 This belief 
system relies on a separate-but-equal logic that regards wom-
en’s homemaking role as equally important and fulfilling as 
men’s career role, even while insisting that these spheres be 
 
 69. E.g., Berna J. Skrypnek & Mark Snyder, On the Self-Perpetuating Na-
ture of Stereotypes About Women and Men, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 277, 288–90 (1982). 
 70. Paul G. Davies et al., Clearing the Air: Safety Moderates the Effects of 
Stereotype Threat on Women’s Leadership Aspirations, 88 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 276, 284 (2005). 
 71. Davies et al., supra note 64, at 1626. 
 72. See generally F.L. Geis et al., TV Commercials as Achievement Scripts 
for Women, 10 SEX ROLES 513 (1984). 
 73. Laurie A. Rudman & Julie E. Phelan, The Effect of Priming Gender 
Roles on Women’s Implicit Gender Beliefs and Career Aspirations, 41 SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 192, 198 (2010); see also Thierry Devos et al., Influence of Mother-
hood on the Implicit Academic Self-Concept of Female College Students: Dis-
tinct Effects of Subtle Exposure to Cues and Directed Thinking, 22 EUR. J. 
PSYCHOL. EDUC. 371, 381–82 (2007) (finding that motherhood cues in the en-
vironment reduced women’s academic self-identification). 
 74. Skrypnek & Snyder, supra note 69, at 288. 
 75. See Miller & Borgida, supra note 8, at 6. 
 76. Id. at 6–8. 
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segregated by gender.77 In other words, this ideology does not 
explicitly argue that women are inferior to men (although the 
reality is that care work in our society is not economically val-
ued and rewarded as much as work in the public sphere). This 
logic is a type of mutual benefits argument,78 because it argues 
that separate gendered spheres benefit both men and women. 
While the third tenet of the SSI is in some ways a matter of 
opinion, scholars have identified several concrete negative out-
comes for men, women, and society that may be related to the 
separation of men and women into different spheres. For ex-
ample, because women have traditionally had less access to the 
workplace sphere than men, they still earn less money than 
men do.79 When couples divorce, women are more often left in a 
state of financial vulnerability.80 A woman’s job is often seen as 
the “second job” in the family, which means it is the first thing 
to be cut if the family relocates or cuts down to a single in-
come.81 Because men are expected to devote themselves fully to 
the workplace, fathers who contribute to caregiving at home 
are often not acknowledged or given credit;82 they are seen as 
“babysitting” their own kids and “helping out” their wives.83 
Some scholars argue that careers have become an integral part 
of masculinity, to the point that society defines men’s success 
and self-worth in terms of their careers, and men are more like-
ly to hide their need for caregiving flexibility at work in order 
to avoid stigma.84 Indeed, the large number of FRD lawsuits85 
brought in the last decade suggests that men and women who 
 
 77. Id. at 7–8. 
 78. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves: The Persis-
tence of Mutual Benefits Arguments for Sex and Race Inequality, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1464, 1464–65 (2009). 
 79. Christine Dugas, Gender Pay Gap Persists, U.S.A. TODAY (Oct. 24, 
2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2012/10/24/ 
gender-pay-gap/1652511. 
 80. WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 21. 
 81. FAYE J. CROSBY, JUGGLING: THE UNEXPECTED ADVANTAGES OF BAL-
ANCING CAREER AND HOME FOR WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES 189 (1991). 
 82. WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 80. 
 83. Briones v. Genuine Parts Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d 711, 715 (E.D. La. 
2002); CROSBY, supra note 81, at 49; Kelli K. García, The Gender Bind: Men as 
Inauthentic Caregivers, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2012). 
 84. See Richard J. Reddick et al., Academic Fathers Pursuing Tenure: A 
Qualitative Study of Work-Family Conflict, Coping Strategies, and Depart-
mental Culture, 13 PSYCHOL. MEN & MASCULINITY 1, 6 (2012); WILLIAMS, su-
pra note 20, at 56–59. 
 85. Cf. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 12, at 181–85 (noting successful 
legal approaches for FRD cases). 
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are penalized at work for trying to participate in both the 
workplace and domestic spheres regard this pressure as harm-
ful and discriminatory, not beneficial. On a broader societal 
level, it has also been suggested that businesses that have not 
introduced worker flexibility into their policies are left with 
over-worked employees, increased employee turnover, and inef-
ficient systems that break down when employees cannot be 
present.86 Thus, although those who endorse the SSI view sepa-
rate gendered spheres as natural and beneficial to individuals 
and society, there is significant evidence that this separation 
causes widespread harm. 
2. How the Separate Spheres Model Diverges from the 
Previous Approach 
Having outlined the features of the SSI, the remainder of 
Part I will discuss how the Separate Spheres Model approaches 
the study of this ideology. The Separate Spheres Model regards 
gender inequality in today’s society as resulting from an inter-
action between individuals’ endorsement of the SSI and struc-
tural and institutional forces of the workplace.87 The Separate 
Spheres Model does not dispute that the processes of descrip-
tive and prescriptive stereotyping play an important role in 
workplace discrimination; years of research studies have 
demonstrated how powerful these processes are.88 Rather, the 
Separate Spheres Model argues that individuals’ endorsement 
of the SSI, combined with environmental factors, determine the 
extent to which descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping and 
various forms of discrimination will occur.89 Thus, the Separate 
Spheres Model places the locus of causation on the individual 
doing the discriminating and his or her own endorsement of the 
SSI.90 This is in contrast to the descriptive and prescriptive ste-
reotyping approach, which, as discussed above, places the locus 
of causation on the victim’s gender-conforming or gender-
nonconforming behavior.91 
The fact that the locus of causation moves to the discrimi-
nator is not merely a matter of semantics. This shift allows re-
searchers to measure and predict variation in discriminatory 
 
 86. WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 65–66. 
 87. See generally Miller & Borgida, supra note 8. 
 88. See supra Parts I.B.1–2. 
 89. See generally Miller & Borgida, supra note 8. 
 90. Id. at 21. 
 91. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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outcomes. For example, research studies using the descriptive 
and prescriptive stereotyping approach find that when men vio-
late masculine norms by helping out with caregiving at home, 
they experience stigma and backlash in the workplace.92 How-
ever, it is unlikely that every man in this situation experiences 
backlash to the same degree every time. Unfortunately, by 
making the victim’s behavior the independent variable in the 
study, this approach is not amenable to measuring and predict-
ing variation in the discriminator’s responses. The scientific in-
quiry is simply: what kinds of target behaviors will cause oth-
ers to discriminate against the target?  
In contrast, the Separate Spheres Model makes individu-
als’ endorsement of the SSI the independent variable in a study 
of discrimination.93 The inquiries become: who is likely to dis-
criminate against others on the basis of their family responsi-
bilities, how severely are they likely to discriminate, and under 
what conditions are they likely to discriminate? It predicts that 
the more an individual endorses the SSI, the more likely he or 
she is to respond in prejudiced ways against other individuals 
who violate the separate spheres; furthermore, those who en-
dorse the SSI more strongly are likely to have stronger prejudi-
cial responses.94 The Separate Spheres Model also regards vari-
ous environmental and institutional factors as independent 
variables; the theory predicts that when an individual who en-
dorses the SSI is placed in a situation which allows him or her 
to express those beliefs, prejudicial and discriminatory out-
comes will become more likely.95 Thus, in contrast to the de-
scriptive and prescriptive stereotyping approach, the Separate 
Spheres Model is equipped to predict when, how strongly, and 
by whom FRD is likely to occur.  
Having described existing social-psychological approaches 
to the study of FRD in Part I, Part II will proceed to discuss 
how theories of gender discrimination have played out in the 
courts in FRD cases. 
 
 92. Coltrane et al., supra note 46, at 297–98; Rudman & Mescher, supra 
note 46, at 335–36; Vandello et al., supra note 46, at 315–16.  
 93. Miller & Borgida, supra note 8, at 20–21. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 21–22. 
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II.  THE FRACTURED DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY 
RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE   
Legal scholars studying FRD have been remarkably in 
tune with social-psychological research on gender stereotyping 
and discrimination.96 In contrast, judges and fact-finders have 
been inconsistent in their understanding of empirical research 
on gender and sometimes rely on their own inaccurate lay theo-
ries to decide cases. This Part will discuss the failing of some 
judges’ lay theorizing and the consequences for plaintiffs in 
FRD cases. Part A will describe some of the common inaccura-
cies in judges’ theories about gender. Part B will discuss the 
relative success women plaintiffs have had in getting the courts 
to recognize FRD as sex discrimination. Finally, Part C will 
discuss the relative failure of the courts to recognize FRD 
against men as sex discrimination. 
A. THE FAILING OF JUDGES’ LAY THEORIES OF GENDER 
A significant part of judges’ jobs requires them to make as-
sertions and assumptions about the nature of human psycholo-
gy and behavior.97 When judges’ theories about human behavior 
align with empirical reality, judges are equipped to make deci-
sions that further justice and the goals of public policy. When 
judges’ theories about human behavior are inaccurate, howev-
er, significant harm to the parties, and society as a whole, can 
result.98 Because human psychology and behavior are so central 
to the law, scholars argue for a “psychological jurisprudence,” 
which aims to “make legal assumptions about human nature as 
consistent with contemporary psychological knowledge as pos-
sible, that is, to close the gap between folk and scientific theo-
ries of the person.”99 In that spirit, it is important that judges 
deciding FRD cases clearly understand how gender stereotyp-
 
 96. See generally, e.g., Williams, supra note 18 (providing a thorough 
overview of research on gender stereotyping and discrimination). 
 97. Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 997, 997 (2006). 
 98. Krieger, supra note 16, at 836–37; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 97, at 
998–1000; see generally BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN 
THE COURTROOM (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008). 
 99. Tom R. Tyler & John T. Jost, Psychology and the Law: Reconciling 
Normative and Descriptive Accounts of Social Justice and System Legitimacy, 
in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 807, 808 (Arie 
W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins eds., 2007). 
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ing and discrimination really work.100 Furthermore, in recent 
years, plaintiffs’ reliance on comparator evidence101 in FRD cas-
es has decreased; instead, more and more plaintiffs are proving 
their cases using evidence of gender stereotyping.102 Thus, the 
need for judges to understand psychological theories of stereo-
typing and discrimination is growing. Having access to a clear 
and consistent theory of the psychological processes underlying 
FRD will help reach this goal.103 Unfortunately, judges’ lay un-
derstanding of gender biases has been inconsistent and often 
inaccurate. The remainder of this section will provide two ma-
jor examples of how judges’ lay theories of discrimination lead 
them astray. Part 1 will discuss the same actor inference, and 
Part 2 will discuss the tendency to believe that discrimination 
happens in discrete, deliberate moments. 
1. The Same Actor Inference 
One example of problematic lay theorizing in the context of 
FRD cases is the same actor inference. Judges tend to believe 
that prejudice, bias, and discrimination are stable, unwavering 
properties of the individual.104 This view implies that if a person 
were going to discriminate against another on the basis of care-
giver status, he or she would do so in every situation and 
against every caregiver.105 This assumption works against 
plaintiffs when, for example, the same supervisor who discrim-
inated against the employee was the person who hired the em-
ployee in the first place.106 In this situation, many courts infer 
that, because the supervisor did not discriminate at the time of 
hiring, he or she must not have discriminated later.107  
 
 100. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 97, at 1000. 
 101. Comparator evidence is evidence showing that an individual who is 
similarly situated to the plaintiff (in all relevant ways except for the plaintiff’s 
protected class) received different treatment from the plaintiff. See BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 321 (9th ed. 2009). The comparison allows the courts to infer 
that the differential treatment was based on the plaintiff’s protected class, 
which makes the case for discrimination. Cuevas v. Am. Express Travel Relat-
ed Servs. Co., 256 F. App’x 241, 243 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 102. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: 
Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stere-
otyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1349–50 (2008). 
 103. See generally Borgida & Fiske, supra note 98.  
 104. Krieger, supra note 16, at 840–41. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 357–58 
(2010). 
 107. Id. 
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Years of research in social psychology have made clear that 
the same actor inference is misguided—stereotyping, bias, and 
discrimination are highly context-dependent.108 However, the 
primary psychological theory that is used to understand FRD 
cases, the theory of descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping, is 
not amenable to an analysis of systematic situational variation 
in stereotyping and discrimination. As discussed in Part I, this 
theoretical approach places the locus of causation on the behav-
ior of the target of discrimination. What this approach has not 
done is produce much research measuring and accounting for 
differences across situations in the discriminator’s tendency to 
discriminate. Thus, plaintiffs cannot offer judges an empirically 
grounded explanation for why instances of FRD might vary 
from situation to situation in their workplaces. When expert 
witnesses are used in these cases, they typically testify on the 
general pattern that gender-conforming or gender-
nonconforming behavior tends to lead to discrimination.109 They 
generally cannot testify as to whether this process likely oc-
curred in any specific case.110 As a result, courts sometimes 
dismiss expert testimony on descriptive and prescriptive stere-
otyping as not providing any more information than their lay 
understanding already provided.111 
2. The Requirement of Discrete, Deliberate Action 
Another common assumption by judges in FRD cases is 
that bias and discrimination happen in a discrete moment at 
the time of the employment decision, and that they are carried 
out deliberately and consciously.112 In contrast to this view, dis-
crimination often occurs outside of conscious awareness and 
 
 108. Catherine Albiston et al., Ten Lessons for Practitioners About Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination and Stereotyping Evidence, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 
1285, 1298 (2008). 
 109. Robin Stryker et al., Employment Discrimination Law and Industrial 
Psychology: Social Science as Social Authority and the Co-Production of Law 
and Science, 37 LAW SOC. INQUIRY 777, 782 (2012); see, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. 
Bloomberg L.P., No. 07 Civ. 8383(LAP), 2010 WL 3466370, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 31, 2010); Ray v. Miller Meester Adver., Inc., 664 N.W.2d 355, 364–66 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 110. See, e.g., Ray, 664 N.W.2d at 366. 
 111. E.g., id. (stating that the expert witness’s “testimony is hardly the 
type of evidence without which laypersons are incapable of forming a correct 
judgment”). 
 112. Krieger, supra note 16, at 838. This problem is true of other forms of 
stereotyping and discrimination (e.g., race, age); it is not limited to sex dis-
crimination or FRD. Id. 
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over time long before the moment of the employment deci-
sion.113 For example, a workplace might be infused with a cul-
ture of masculinity that discourages men from taking leave to 
engage in caregiving.114 This situation does not involve a specif-
ic moment of intentional discriminatory action; however, it may 
lead to significant levels of gender inequality and FRD.115 The 
descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping approach recognizes 
that workplace culture may generally influence FRD, but it is 
not amenable to the identification of specific workplace factors 
that make FRD more likely.116 Because this approach places the 
explanatory focus on the target of discrimination, rather than 
the discriminator and the environment in which the discrimi-
nator operates, there has not been a systematic attempt by re-
searchers to identify specific workplace characteristics that 
lead to FRD. This makes it difficult for plaintiffs to articulate 
their cases in situations that lack a specific discriminatory 
moment or policy.117  
As these few examples illustrate, lay theorizing by the 
courts is a significant problem when their assumptions do not 
align with empirical reality. The goal of FRD scholars and prac-
titioners should be to bring cases using clear, consistent, and 
empirically supported theories of gender stereotyping and dis-
crimination in an effort to reduce courts’ reliance on faulty rea-
soning. The next section analyzes the courts’ willingness to rec-
ognize FRD against women as sex discrimination after being 
exposed to social-psychological research on descriptive and pre-
scriptive stereotyping. The remainder of Part II will discuss the 
failure of the courts to extend this reasoning to cases of FRD 
against men and the need to bring a new theoretical perspec-
tive to FRD jurisprudence. 
B. THE COURTS’ WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE FRD AGAINST 
WOMEN AS SEX DISCRIMINATION 
There is currently no federal statute that defines caregiv-
ers as a protected class.118 This means that there is no FRD 
 
 113. Albiston et al., supra note 108, at 1298. 
 114. See Williams et al., supra note 5, at 220–21. 
 115. See id.  
 116. See supra Parts I.B.1–3. 
 117. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553–56 
(2011). 
 118. Steven L. Locke, Family Responsibilities Discrimination and the New 
York City Model: A Map for Future Legislation, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 19, 29 
(2009). A few states and several dozen local governments recognize parental or 
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cause of action per se. In order to succeed in a federal claim, a 
plaintiff must fit FRD under another existing cause of action. 
FRD cases arise under several different statutes, including Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA), the Employment Pay Act (EPA), and the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).119 Title VII of-
fers plaintiffs the most flexibility in the types of legal theories 
they can bring; furthermore, Title VII covers more employers 
than the FMLA and other statutes.120 Therefore, plaintiffs are 
in the most advantageous position if they can convince the 
court that the FRD they experienced was based on sex for the 
purposes of Title VII.121 
Women have experienced significant success convincing 
the courts that FRD against them is based on sex, particularly 
once they began to systematically articulate a theory of descrip-
tive and prescriptive stereotyping to the courts.122 The number 
of FRD cases filed in federal courts has risen sharply since 
1999, as has the number of cases decided by the courts.123 Al-
most 90% of the plaintiffs in FRD cases are women.124 Further-
more, employees succeed in FRD cases at higher rates than 
they do in other types of employment discrimination cases.125  
One example of a successful FRD plaintiff under Title VII 
was Tracey Lust.126 Lust’s supervisor passed her over for a 
promotion because he assumed that, because she had children, 
 
caregiver status as a protected class for discrimination purposes. Williams & 
Bornstein, supra note 102, at 1346. 
 119. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 12, at 181–82. 
 120. See García, supra note 83, at 6. 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). Title VII makes it unlawful for an em-
ployer to discriminate against an employee “because of such individual’s . . . 
sex.” Id. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court ruled that dis-
crimination against an individual because he or she fails to conform to gender 
stereotypes is sex discrimination under Title VII. 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989); 
see also Stephanie Bornstein, The Legal and Policy Implications of the “Flexi-
bility Stigma”, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 389, 389–91 (2013). 
 122. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 102, at 1343. For examples of suc-
cessful cases, see Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2004); Back v. Has-
tings on Hudson Union Free School District, 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004); Troy 
v. Bay State Computer Group, Inc., 141 F.3d 378 (1st Cir. 1998); Stern v. 
Cintas Corp., 319 F. Supp. 2d 841 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 123. CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, FAMILY RE-
SPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION: LITIGATION UPDATE 2010 7–8 (2010). 
 124. Id. at 13. 
 125. Id. at 11. 
 126. See Lust, 383 F.3d at 583. 
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she would not be interested in a job position that required her 
to relocate.127 The supervisor never asked Lust whether she 
would be interested in relocating, and she expressed interest in 
the promotion several times.128 Lust was fortunate in the sense 
that her supervisor had made numerous sexist comments dur-
ing her employment, making it fairly easy to ground the promo-
tion decision in a theory of sex discrimination. For example, 
when Lust expressed interest in a promotion on one occasion, 
shortly after having gotten married, her supervisor commented 
that he was surprised, and asked why her husband was not go-
ing to take care of her.129 He also admitted in court that the 
reason he had not considered Lust for the promotion was the 
fact that she had a family.130 Thus, Lust was able to convince 
the court that the FRD she experienced was based on sex for 
the purposes of Title VII.131 Her supervisor’s actions were based 
on descriptive stereotypes that women with children lack the 
motivation to excel in their careers. They were also based on 
prescriptive stereotypes that push women to prioritize their 
children over their careers and depend on their husbands for 
income. 
Shireen Walsh was another woman plaintiff who success-
fully brought an FRD claim under Title VII.132 When Walsh 
came back to work after having her first child, she faced enor-
mous hostility from her supervisor.133 Walsh’s supervisor closely 
scrutinized every minute of Walsh’s absences, despite the fact 
that other employees were allowed to come and go as they 
pleased without notice, made Walsh stay later in the day than 
other employees, put up a sign on Walsh’s cubicle that said 
“Out—Sick Child,” referred to Walsh’s son as “the sickling,” 
and threw a phone book at Walsh, demanding that she find a 
pediatrician who was open after business hours.134 On one occa-
sion, Walsh fainted at work as a result of the stress she was 
under; when she returned the next day, her supervisor said, 
“[Y]ou better not be pregnant again.”135 The court found that 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1160 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
 133. Id. at 1154. 
 134. Id. at 1154–55. 
 135. Id. at 1155. 
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these actions amounted to sex discrimination for the purposes 
of Title VII.136 The actions of Walsh’s supervisor were based on 
descriptive stereotypes of women with children as not commit-
ted enough to the workplace and not dependable enough to be 
trusted managing their own work schedules. 
A third example of a woman plaintiff who succeeded in an 
FRD case under Title VII is Kellie Meier.137 Meier worked at a 
hotel and was in charge of overseeing all of the food service and 
catering, including training new staff.138 Shortly after Meier be-
gan experiencing complications with her pregnancy, her super-
visor hired a man to serve as a manager above her.139 The new 
manager commented in one meeting that “a woman’s place is in 
the home.”140 Shortly thereafter, Meier was demoted to a part-
time server position.141 The court denied the hotel’s motion for 
summary judgment, finding that Meier successfully made a 
prima facie case that her demotion was based on sex for the 
purposes of Title VII.142 Meier’s demotion was based on pre-
scriptive stereotypes that encourage women to opt out of the 
workplace once they have children and devote themselves to 
childbearing and childcare. 
These cases represent just a few examples of women’s suc-
cess as plaintiffs in FRD lawsuits, and they are fairly repre-
sentative of the types of cases that succeed under Title VII.143 In 
each case, the plaintiff was able to articulate to the court the 
fact that FRD in her case was, at its heart, based on sex. This 
success rate is likely at least partly due to the concerted efforts 
of legal scholars who have worked to establish FRD as a legiti-
mate type of sex discrimination under Title VII and other stat-
utes.144 It may also be due to the fact that, unlike in standard 
 
 136. Id. at 1160. 
 137. See Meier v. Noble Hospitality, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184 (S.D. 
Iowa 2001). 
 138. Id. at 1179. 
 139. Id. at 1180. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1184. 
 143. For more examples, see Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free 
School District, 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004); Troy v. Bay State Computer 
Group, Inc., 141 F.3d 378 (1st Cir. 1998); Stern v. Cintas Corp., 319 F. Supp. 
2d 841 (N.D. Ill. 2004); and Eslinger v. U.S. Central Credit Union, 866 F. 
Supp. 491 (D. Kan. 1994). 
 144. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 19; Williams & Bornstein, supra note 
12. These efforts also led the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to 
issue guidelines in 2007 explicitly interpreting family responsibilities discrim-
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sex or race discrimination cases, it is fairly common in FRD 
cases for discriminating parties to make comments out loud 
that reveal their discriminatory motivations.145 Increasingly, 
courts are allowing these comments to serve as evidence of dis-
criminatory motive, rather than dismissing them as irrelevant 
“stray remarks.”146  
As this cause of action has matured, more recent FRD cas-
es have relied less on expert testimony to make arguments 
about gender stereotypes.147 The courts have become increasing-
ly familiar with the concepts of descriptive and prescriptive ste-
reotyping, even though they may not often use that terminolo-
gy.148 According to Joan Williams and Stephanie Bornstein, 
“[f]ifteen years of stereotyping evidence has given even the lay-
person the power to understand that an employer who makes 
decisions about individual female employees based on stereo-
types about women’s behavior is engaging in gender discrimi-
nation.”149 However, as described above, judges’ lay theorizing 
about gender stereotyping and discrimination is spotty at 
best.150 As the remainder of this Part will argue, it is not yet 
time to abandon attempts to inform the courts about the empir-
ical realities of gender discrimination. For many who experi-
ence FRD, particularly men, lay theories of gender discrimina-
tion do not suffice. 
C. THE COURTS’ FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE FRD AGAINST MEN AS 
SEX DISCRIMINATION  
In order to reduce gendered inequality and discrimination 
in the workplace, the courts must address FRD against both 
men and women. As long as courts continue to assume that 
FRD is a women’s problem, the structural forces that underlie 
this form of inequality will go unaddressed.151 It is a start that 
 
ination as a form of unlawful sex discrimination. See Enforcement Guidance: 
Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 2 
EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615 (May 23, 2007), available at http://www 
.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.pdf.  
 145. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 12, at 176. 
 146. Albiston et al., supra note 108, at 1293–97. 
 147. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 12, at 175. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See supra Parts II.A.1–2. 
 151. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: Uncov-
ering the Masculine Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & 
L. 253, 253–57 (2013); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox 
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men have brought substantial numbers of FRD cases in the last 
decade.152 Most of these cases, however, are brought under the 
FMLA.153 Only about half of the employees in the U.S. are cov-
ered by the FMLA, because many workplaces are not large 
enough to fall under its requirements, and relief under this 
statute is limited to certain leave-related causes of action.154 
Therefore, it is important that men be able to bring their FRD 
cases as sex discrimination cases under Title VII. Social-
psychological research makes clear that FRD against men is 
based on gender stereotypes.155 As described above, men who 
engage in caregiving are often regarded as not masculine 
enough at work, because they are seen as defying prescriptive 
stereotypes that encourage men to devote themselves fully to 
their careers.156 Despite the clear empirical connection between 
FRD against men and sex stereotyping and discrimination, the 
courts have been reluctant to recognize these claims as sex dis-
crimination for the purposes of Title VII.  
Tom Hayden is one example of a man who was unsuccess-
ful in an FRD case under Title VII.157 When Hayden requested 
FMLA leave to care for his wife and newborn baby, a human 
resources officer questioned his request, stating, “[i]t’s very 
strange that we have a male manager request that amount of 
time off, we have never had that before.”158 Hayden’s request for 
leave was initially granted, but he was fired one week later.159 
Hayden sued under both the FMLA and Title VII, but his Title 
VII claim was defeated.160 The judge declared that because 
Hayden was replaced by another man, a member of the same 
protected class, he could not make a case for sex discrimination 
under Title VII.161 The human resources officer’s comment 
strongly suggests that Hayden was fired because he did not fit 
 
and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Work-
place, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 79–82 (1989).  
 152. See CALVERT, supra note 123, at 13 (finding that 11.6% of FRD cases 
filed between 1999–2008 were brought by men). 
 153. Bornstein, supra note 17, at 1323–25. 
 154. Id. at 1325; García, supra note 83, at 6. 
 155. E.g., Williams et al., supra note 5, at 220–21. 
 156. See supra Part I.B.2.  
 157. See Hayden v. Garden Ridge Mgmt., LLC, No. CIV.A 4:08CV172, 2009 
WL 5196718, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009). 
 158. Id. at *4 (alteration in original). 
 159. Id. at *1. 
 160. Id. at *5. 
 161. Id. 
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in with prescriptive stereotypes that push men to devote all of 
their time to the workplace and leave domestic work to women. 
However, the judge grossly misunderstood how sex discrimina-
tion works, believing that sex discrimination required a show-
ing that the employer rejected all men for Hayden’s position. 
This is another example of the misguided same actor inference, 
or the notion that an individual who discriminates does so in 
every situation and against every individual of the same 
class.162 On the contrary, hiring only men who avoid caregiving 
responsibilities is sex discrimination.  
Another example of this fundamental misunderstanding is 
in the case of Anthony Marchioli.163 Marchioli requested an af-
ternoon off after his girlfriend became pregnant, so that he 
could help her find a doctor.164 Afterward, he was subjected to 
extreme scrutiny at work and negative evaluations from his 
supervisor.165 In a written evaluation, Marchioli’s supervisor 
said, “If you don’t want to ‘buy in’ and put a maximum effort in-
to developing your career, do me . . . a favor and quit now. . . . 
I’m not going to tolerate working with a guy who does not give 
it his all.”166 A few weeks later, Marchioli was fired.167 The court 
dismissed Marchioli’s Title VII claim, because it found that 
Marchioli was terminated because of his parental status, which 
is not a protected class under Title VII, and not because of his 
sex.168 The comments from Marchioli’s supervisor could not be 
clearer in revealing that Marchioli was punished for failing to 
comply with masculine prescriptive norms of career devotion. 
However, the court’s misunderstanding of gender stereotyping 
and discrimination led it to view the discrimination as based 
narrowly on parental status only. If the court in this case had a 
basic understanding of how FRD is known to operate, it would 
have seen that Marchioli’s experience was sex discrimination. 
Instead, it dismissed Marchioli’s case before he had a chance to 
make it.169 
 
 162. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 163. See Marchioli v. Garland Co., No. 5:11-CV-124 (MAD/ATB), 2011 WL 
1983350, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011). 
 164. Id. at *1. 
 165. Id. at *1–2. 
 166. Id. at *1. 
 167. Id. at *2. 
 168. Id. at *5. 
 169. Marchioli v. Garland Co., No. 5:11-CV-124 (MAD/ATB), 2011 WL 
1983350, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011) (granting the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss the complaint). 
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Despite what these cases suggest, a cause of action for men 
who experience FRD in the workplace already exists under Ti-
tle VII.170 The problem is that many courts, and sometimes 
plaintiffs, fail to recognize FRD against men as being based in 
gender stereotypes.171 It is not clear why a basic understanding 
of descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping against women has 
not spread to cases involving men. It is possible that judges are 
simply not accustomed to thinking about sex discrimination as 
a problem faced by men. What is clear, however, is that schol-
ars need to re-double their efforts to educate the courts regard-
ing the empirical reality of sex discrimination. Men and women 
will not achieve gender equality (not to mention work-life bal-
ance) until women are given full access to the workforce and 
men are given full access to the domestic sphere. As long as 
women continue to be overburdened with disproportionate 
amounts of domestic work and men continue to be dismissed as 
sincere caregivers, both women and men will be harmed by rig-
id gender roles. As Kelli García has argued, “a new focus on 
men as caregivers is necessary to promote workplace equality 
and gender equity within families, allowing both men and 
women to live full lives that include both work and family 
life.”172 In Part III, I argue that emerging research on the Sepa-
rate Spheres Model provides a theoretical perspective that can 
unite the current fragmented case law on FRD in the workplace 
and provide litigation advantages over the descriptive and pre-
scriptive stereotyping approach. 
III.  THE ADVANTAGES OF THE SEPARATE SPHERES 
MODEL IN FRD LITIGATION   
As discussed above, the Separate Spheres Model diverges 
in several important ways from the descriptive and prescriptive 
stereotyping approach.173 The Separate Spheres Model does not 
dispute that the processes of descriptive and prescriptive stere-
otyping play an important role in workplace discrimination. 
Rather, it asks different questions than the previous approach 
and moves the explanatory focus from the target of discrimina-
tion to the discriminator. This Part will analyze how the Sepa-
 
 170. Bornstein, supra note 17, at 1335.  
 171. Id. at 1342. For relatively rare examples of successful cases by male 
plaintiffs, see Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001); Schafer v. 
Board of Public Education, 903 F.2d 243 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 172. García, supra note 83, at 5. 
 173. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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rate Spheres Model provides several distinct advantages for 
both men and women in FRD litigation. Part A will discuss the 
theoretical and evidentiary advantages that the theory offers. 
Part B will analyze the relative strength of causal arguments 
under the theory. Finally, Part C will examine how this theo-
retical approach allows employers to prevent the occurrence of 
FRD and reduce litigation. 
A. THE SEPARATE SPHERES MODEL OFFERS THEORETICAL AND 
EVIDENTIARY ADVANTAGES 
As discussed above, the descriptive and prescriptive stereo-
typing approach to FRD is not particularly amenable to predict-
ing variation.174 The scientific inquiry underlying this approach 
asks: what types of target behaviors will cause others to dis-
criminate against the target? Research using this approach 
finds that when women engage in gender-conforming behavior 
by taking on caregiving roles, they experience backlash.175 Con-
versely, when men engage in gender-nonconforming behavior 
by taking on caregiving roles, they experience backlash.176 
However, it is unlikely that all acts of gender-conforming or 
gender-nonconforming behavior result in backlash in every sit-
uation and to the same degree. The Separate Spheres Model al-
lows researchers to measure and predict variation in FRD 
across individuals and situations, rather than treating this var-
iation as error.177 This has important implications for FRD liti-
gation, which the remainder of this Part will discuss. Part 1 
explains the theoretical and evidentiary advantages offered by 
the Separate Spheres Model approach, and Part 2 describes 
what FRD legal theories and evidence would look like in an 
ideal world. 
1. Theoretical and Evidentiary Advantages Offered by the 
Separate Spheres Model 
Recall the same actor inference discussed in Part II(A)(1). 
Courts commonly presume that an individual who might dis-
criminate against someone on the basis of a protected class will 
 
 174. See supra Part I.C. 
 175. See Williams et al., supra note 5, at 221–22. See generally Heilman, 
supra note 28 (describing how both prescriptive and descriptive stereotypes 
can negatively impact the career progress of women). 
 176. Williams et al., supra note 5, at 220–21. 
 177. Miller & Borgida, supra note 8, at 20–21. 
MILLER_4fmt 11/3/2014 4:51 PM 
2014] THE SEPARATE SPHERES IDEOLOGY 371 
 
do so for all individuals in that class and in any situation.178 
The Separate Spheres Model makes clear that only in some sit-
uations is a person’s endorsement of the separate spheres ide-
ology likely to manifest as discrimination.179 An ongoing pro-
gram of social-psychological research investigates different sit-
situational factors that may play a role in this process.180 For 
example, it is possible that in workplaces that give supervisors 
high amounts of discretion in employee evaluations, supervi-
sors find it easier to act on their personal gender ideologies.181 
As a result, one would expect to see more FRD in workplaces 
with high supervisor discretion, and, within these environ-
ments, more FRD among supervisors who more strongly en-
dorse the SSI. Another possibility is that moment-to-moment 
situational factors influence the expression of gender ideology. 
For example, it is possible that when a supervisor’s cognitive 
resources are depleted (when he or she is hungry, tired, or dis-
tracted), he or she is less able to inhibit discriminatory re-
sponses against employees with caregiving responsibilities.182 
In this case, one would expect to see more FRD from a given 
supervisor during times of cognitive depletion and less FRD 
from that supervisor when cognitive resources were replen-
ished. Both of these outcomes would be explained by systematic 
and predictable variation in contextual workplace factors, and 
 
 178. Krieger, supra note 16, at 840–41. 
 179. See generally Miller & Borgida, supra note 8 (studying the psychologi-
cal processes underlying individuals’ endorsement of SSI). 
 180. The author is currently conducting this research with colleagues at 
the University of Minnesota.  
 181. See, e.g., Thomas C. Monson et al., Specifying When Personality Traits 
Can and Cannot Predict Behavior: An Alternative to Abandoning the Attempt 
to Predict Single-Act Criteria, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 385, 397 
(1982) (finding that when participants were put in situations that induced few 
constraints on their personality traits, personality was highly correlated with 
behavior). 
 182. For general reviews of the relationship between cognitive load and 
stereotyping, see Diana J. Burgess, Are Providers More Likely To Contribute to 
Healthcare Disparities Under High Levels of Cognitive Load? How Features of 
the Healthcare Setting May Lead to Biases in Medical Decision Making, 30 
MED. DECISION MAKING 246 (2010); Jeffrey W. Sherman et al., Encoding Flex-
ibility Revisited: Evidence for Enhanced Encoding of Stereotype-Inconsistent 
Information Under Cognitive Load, 22 SOC. COGNITION 214 (2004); Daniel P. 
Skorich & Kenneth I. Mavor, Cognitive Load Privileges Memory-Based over 
Data-Driven Processing, Not Group-Level over Person Level Processing, 52 
BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 469 (2013); Daniel H.J. Wigboldus et al., Capacity and 
Comprehension: Spontaneous Stereotyping Under Cognitive Load, 22 SOC. 
COGNITION 292 (2004). 
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both would provide clear evidence against the same actor infer-
ence.  
Another misguided assumption of the courts is that dis-
crimination occurs within conscious awareness and in a dis-
crete moment at the time of the employment decision.183 Once 
again, the descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping approach 
recognizes that workplace culture plays a role in FRD.184 How-
ever, this approach is not amenable to the identification, meas-
urement, and prediction of specific workplace cultural factors 
that might cause FRD to increase.185 In contrast, the Separate 
Spheres Model allows researchers to identify certain factors of 
workplace environments that cause individuals’ endorsement of 
the SSI to be more or less likely to translate into FRD.186 For 
example, it is possible that the basic structure of how jobs are 
defined influences individuals’ perceptions of what it means to 
be a dedicated employee.187 One might imagine that in a work-
place in which employees have set hours and extensive proce-
dures for requesting leave or flexibility, high-SSI employees 
might view a co-worker who needs a few days off here and 
there as deviating from masculine workplace norms.188 In a 
workplace in which employees arrange their own hours or are 
allowed to do some of their work from home, a co-worker who 
needs a few days off is less likely to raise any alarms, even from 
co-workers who endorse the SSI.189 This outcome would be ex-
plained by systematic and predictable variation in contextual 
workplace factors, and it would provide clear evidence against 
the assumption that FRD always happens in discrete, inten-
tional moments by one individual.190 
2. What FRD Legal Theories and Evidence Would Look Like 
in an Ideal World 
Using the Separate Spheres Model to enhance theory and 
evidence in FRD cases involves efforts by several different par-
ties. First, social psychologists who are interested in addressing 
FRD should focus their efforts on studying features of the 
 
 183. See supra Part II.A.2; Krieger, supra note 16, at 838. 
 184. Miller & Borgida, supra note 8, at 21.  
 185. Id. at 20. 
 186. Id. at 20–21. 
 187. Id. at 15–16.  
 188. See Monson et al., supra note 181, at 386. 
 189. See id.   
 190. Miller & Borgida, supra note 8, at 41; Krieger, supra note 16, at 838. 
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workplace environment that either increase or decrease indi-
viduals’ ability to translate their endorsement of the SSI into 
actions against their employees. At this point in time, the pri-
mary shortcoming of the Separate Spheres Model is that it is a 
new approach in social psychology, and researchers are just be-
ginning to utilize it in empirical research.191 Ideally, psycholo-
gists will begin to conduct more research using this approach 
and will quickly build a body of evidence that legal scholars and 
practitioners can rely on. As social psychologists study the role 
of the SSI in workplaces more in depth, specific environmental 
and institutional factors that influence FRD will be identified. 
The Separate Spheres Model makes it easier for scientists to 
identify systematic sources of situational variation in FRD,192 
and it makes it easier for legal scholars and plaintiffs to apply 
this knowledge to specific cases. 
Second, in an ideal world, lawyers who represent plaintiffs 
in FRD cases would consider the value of expert testimony on 
FRD rather than trusting in judges’ and juries’ lay theories of 
gender. The Separate Spheres Model may allow plaintiffs to 
bring stronger expert testimony than in the past. Recall that 
expert witnesses typically comment on the general processes of 
stereotyping and discrimination without being able to testify 
whether these processes took place in a specific workplace.193 
Using the Separate Spheres Model, a plaintiff can bring an ex-
pert witness to testify regarding the specific workplace factors 
known to contribute to FRD and the extent to which these fac-
tors are present in a specific workplace (for example, by testify-
ing that research has shown a correlation between supervisor 
discretion and instances of FRD and that the defendant’s em-
ployment records reveal a high amount of supervisor discretion 
that resembles the research). Some scholars argue that expert 
witnesses should not provide testimony on specific causation in 
discrimination cases.194 However, many psychological phenom-
 
 191. Miller & Borgida, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
 192. Id. at 20–21.  
 193. See supra Part II.A.1; Susan T. Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Standards 
for Using Social Psychological Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 
83 TEMP. L. REV. 867, 875 (2011) (discussing the distinction between general 
and specific causation in expert testimony).  
 194. E.g., David L. Faigman, Evidentiary Incommensurability: A Prelimi-
nary Exploration of the Problem of Reasoning from General Scientific Data to 
Individualized Legal Decision-Making, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1115, 1135–36 
(2010); John Monahan, et al., The Limits of Social Framework Evidence, 8 L. 
PROBABILITY & RISK 307, 308 (2009).  
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ena are well-established enough to allow scientists to make 
probabilistic judgments about specific cases, and this type of 
testimony is consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence.195 
This type of evidence would be more likely to be accepted by the 
courts as relevant and helpful to the factfinder.196 Thus, plain-
tiffs would benefit from having access to a theory that allows 
for a closer analysis of structural and situational variation in 
FRD and from the stronger evidence that would result. 
Third, in an ideal world, judges would acknowledge that 
they are subject to many of the same cognitive biases as other 
human beings and that some of their lay theories of gender dis-
crimination may be flawed. They would make efforts to incor-
porate empirically supported evidence into their understanding 
of stereotyping and discrimination or, at the very least, be re-
ceptive to the idea that expert testimony on gender discrimina-
tion might better inform the fact-finding process. Judges who 
routinely dismiss psychologists’ expert testimony as not rele-
vant or helpful to the factfinder do a disservice to FRD cases. It 
may seem implausible that many judges will acknowledge that 
their own folk theories of gender discrimination are imperfect. 
Human beings, after all, tend to view their own perceptions of 
the world as accurate and complete.197 However, legal scholars 
who study FRD have been quite successful over the past decade 
 
 195. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Eugene Borgida, et al., Stereotyping Research 
and Employment Discrimination: Time To See the Forest for the Trees, 14 
INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 405, 407 (2008); Melissa Hart & Paul M. 
Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in Employment Dis-
crimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 45 (2009). 
 196. C.f. Ray v. Miller Meester Adver., Inc., 664 N.W.2d 355, 364–66 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (ruling that the expert witness’s testimony was inad-
missible because it did not go beyond a layperson’s understanding of how gen-
der stereotypes work in general). 
 197. See generally, e.g., Dale W. Griffin & Lee Ross, Subjective Construal, 
Social Inference, and Human Misunderstanding, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERI-
MENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 319 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1991) (finding that in-
dividuals sometimes fail to understand that others see the world differently); 
Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus 
Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369 (2002) (describing that 
individuals see biases in others more so than in themselves); Emily Pronin et 
al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 636 
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (describing how individuals tend to see 
their own view of the world as unbiased); Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Re-
alism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstand-
ing, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103 (Edward S. Reed et al., eds., 1996) (find-
ing that individuals fail to make adequate allowances for differences in others’ 
world view which can have consequences on interaction). 
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in teaching the courts that FRD is a type of sex discrimination 
using empirical evidence from social psychology.198 I argue that 
continued attempts to educate the courts about the nature of 
gender and caregiver discrimination will be worth the effort. 
B. THE SEPARATE SPHERES MODEL MAKES CAUSATION 
ARGUMENTS MORE PERSUASIVE 
As described in Part I(C), the prescriptive and descriptive 
stereotyping approach puts the explanatory focus on the victim 
of discrimination—the victim engages in gender conforming or 
non-conforming behavior that causes others to react negative-
ly.199 This causal logic puts plaintiffs in an awkward position 
when arguing that another individual’s gender stereotypes 
were the cause of the discrimination that they experienced. 
Part 1 of this section examines how the Separate Spheres Mod-
el provides stronger causal arguments in FRD cases, and Part 2 
describes what FRD causal arguments would look like in an 
ideal world. 
1. Causation Advantages Offered by the Separate Spheres 
Model 
As mentioned above in Part II(C), male plaintiffs in partic-
ular have had some difficulty articulating the causal theory of 
FRD against them, possibly accounting for their low success 
rates in Title VII FRD claims.200 However, this difficulty is not 
limited to men. Women bringing FRD claims, particularly in 
the early years of this cause of action, often made their argu-
ments using failure-to-accommodate theories.201 They argued 
that they engaged in gendered behavior (such as wanting to 
work part time to accommodate a breastfeeding schedule), and 
their employers failed to accommodate this workplace deviance 
and took adverse actions against them.202  
This argument fits well with the descriptive and prescrip-
tive stereotyping approach, which regards the employee’s be-
havior as the causal nexus of the problem;203 however, it is dis-
advantageous in FRD litigation. Failure-to-accommodate 
 
 198. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 12, at 175–76. 
 199. See Miller & Borgida, supra note 8, at 21. 
 200. Bornstein, supra note 17, at 1335–36. 
 201. See, e.g., Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 928–29 (4th Cir. 1988) (per 
curiam). 
 202. Id.  
 203. Miller & Borgida, supra note 8, at 20. 
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arguments tend to fail under Title VII because the statute does 
not require employers to accommodate employees’ gendered 
behavior; it only requires non-discrimination.204 This means 
that if women want to increase their rates of success in Title 
VII FRD claims, and if men want to begin succeeding in Title 
VII claims in meaningful numbers, they should shift the ex-
planatory focus in their arguments of causation by providing a 
Separate Spheres Model narrative of discrimination. 
2. What FRD Causal Arguments Would Look Like in an Ideal 
World 
As discussed above, women began to succeed in meaningful 
numbers in FRD cases when legal scholars and lawyers began 
to systematically frame FRD as a form of sex discrimination.205 
In litigation, this type of issue framing takes place as early as 
the filing of the Complaint, and it continues throughout other 
filings and in trial. For purposes of Title VII, lawyers ideally 
should avoid failure-to-accommodate frames, which argue that 
the plaintiff wanted to take some form of gendered, workplace-
deviant action and the defendant refused to allow it.206 In an 
ideal world, the argument would be that the employer’s en-
dorsement of the SSI, combined with structural features of the 
workplace that allowed this ideology to manifest, caused ad-
verse actions against the employee. In other words, the em-
ployer held traditional stereotypes about the roles of men and 
women at work and in the home, and the employer penalized 
the plaintiff for failing to adhere to those stereotypes. The more 
plaintiffs articulate the harm they experienced as a form of sex 
discrimination affirmatively enacted against them by their em-
ployers, the more consistently the courts will recognize FRD as 
a form of sex discrimination against both men and women. 
 
 204. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 12, at 173. See also Barrash, 846 
F.2d at 931–32 (finding that under Title VII, “people, male and female, suffer-
ing extended incapacity from illness or injury” are not equivalent to “young 
mothers wishing to nurse little babies” when requesting workplace accommo-
dations).  
 205. See supra Part II.B. 
 206. Failure-to-accommodate arguments may be more appropriate under 
other causes of action. Although Title VII does not require employers to ac-
commodate employees’ caregiving needs, some disability and labor statutes do. 
See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117, 
12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (including “not making reasonable accommodations” in 
the definition of discrimination). 
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C. THE SEPARATE SPHERES MODEL HELPS EMPLOYERS 
PREVENT DISCRIMINATION AND LITIGATION 
Finally, the fact that the Separate Spheres Model allows 
for the systematic study of workplace and contextual factors 
that influence FRD means that employers are more empowered 
to prevent discrimination from occurring in the first place. As 
discussed above, the descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping 
approach does little to identify the types of workplace factors 
that might put an employee at risk for experiencing FRD.207 
This means that employers have little opportunity to identify 
and correct FRD risk factors in their workplaces, and employ-
ees have little option but to wait to be discriminated against 
and then sue. Part 1 of this section proposes that the Separate 
Spheres Model addresses this problem by allowing employers to 
prevent discrimination, and Part 2 describes what employment 
practices would look like in an ideal world. 
1. Preventative Advantages Offered by the Separate Spheres 
Model 
Joan Williams argues that employers should be held to 
something like a negligence standard in FRD cases—if they do 
not actively assess their own workplaces for the risk of FRD, 
then they have not used reasonable care and should be held ac-
countable.208 This approach is helpful to plaintiffs because it 
prevents employers from making the argument that, because 
they were unaware of their own employees’ gender attitudes, 
they cannot be held responsible for individuals who engage in 
FRD. However, if employers are unable to identify specific as-
pects of their workplaces that are in need of change, this ap-
proach is unlikely to succeed. The Separate Spheres Model ad-
dresses this problem by allowing researchers to identify very 
specific workplace factors that contribute to FRD. As these fac-
tors are identified and understood better by psychologists, em-
ployers can begin to use this knowledge to proactively prevent 
instances of FRD.  
2. What Employment Practices Would Look Like in an Ideal 
World 
As research on the Separate Spheres Model unfolds, em-
ployers should be aware of developments in research on fea-
 
 207. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 208. Williams, supra note 18, at 446–48. 
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tures of the workplace that increase instances of FRD. In an 
ideal world, employers would actively monitor their own work-
places for FRD risk factors and do their best to eliminate these 
factors. Individual supervisors might even be motivated to as-
sess their own endorsement of the separate spheres ideology 
using the SSI scale.  
Some might argue that employers should avoid creating a 
record of the level of bias that exists in their workplaces, in or-
der to avoid liability in future lawsuits. However, there are 
likely ways to examine FRD risk factors in the workplace that 
instead create records of attempts to eliminate bias, which can 
be used in the employer’s favor in litigation. There are also 
likely ways for individual supervisors to examine their own en-
dorsement of the SSI anonymously and in ways that do not cre-
ate a written record. This opportunity is not available under 
the descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping approach, which 
has not led to the measurement of individual variation in the 
likelihood of discriminatory responses. If employers stay at-
tuned to research developments on the Separate Spheres Mod-
el, both employers and employees may benefit from an ap-
proach that prevents FRD from occurring, rather than simply 
providing damages after the fact. 
  CONCLUSION   
FRD is a significant problem in today’s workplaces, and it 
plays an important role in the gender disparities that persist 
despite major legal reforms. Both men and women who are vic-
tims of FRD deserve legal relief. Social psychologists’ research 
on descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping in the workplace 
has been pivotal in persuading courts to recognize FRD as a le-
gal harm and to recognize existing sex discrimination laws as 
modes of relief for this harm. Furthermore, legal scholars’ reli-
ance on descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping research and 
their persistence in convincing courts to pay attention to empir-
ical developments is commendable. The importance of these 
scholars’ work in the movement to craft legal solutions to FRD 
cannot be overstated.  
However, the legal utility of the descriptive and prescrip-
tive stereotyping approach is diminishing now that many 
courts believe that their lay theories of gender stereotypes and 
discrimination are accurate. The Separate Spheres Model offers 
a variety of rhetorical, empirical, and legal advantages in FRD 
cases. The Separate Spheres Model allows for the identification 
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of workplace and situational factors that lead to FRD, provides 
plaintiffs with more effective expert testimony, encourages both 
men and women to rely on discrimination arguments rather 
than failure-to-accommodate arguments, and empowers em-
ployers to prevent FRD in the first place. This Note serves as a 
call to action for scholars, legal practitioners, and employers in-
terested in addressing gender inequality to work toward the 
development of the Separate Spheres Model and the integra-
tion of this empirical approach into FRD jurisprudence.  
 
